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ABSTRACT
This Issue Brief explores an oft-neglected irony in international
e-discovery: the rationales used by courts to compel discovery
against foreign parties embroiled in litigation in U.S. courts may
contradict courts’ reasoning when compelling discovery against
U.S. parties engaged in litigation overseas. U.S. courts often grant
petitions for discovery, increasingly electronic in form, both
against a foreign party in the U.S. and against a domestic party
abroad. Although allowing discovery in both scenarios appears
consistent, it actually ignores important counterconsiderations like
fairness and reciprocity in different legal systems. Because the rise
of technology has exacerbated the existing problem, making
discovery more expensive and time-consuming, this Brief proposes
that, when examining 28 U.S.C. § 1782 claims, courts adopt a more
conservative approach to foreign-discoverability and a
comparative approach to the balancing test set forth in Intel Corp.
v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Heraeus Kulzer GmbH (Heraeus), a German company,
petitioned the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana for an order
under 28 U.S.C. § 17821 compelling U.S.-style discovery against Biomet, a
U.S. company embroiled in a trade secrets dispute with Heraeus in the
German courts.2 In both the German proceedings and the U.S. § 1782
motion, Heraeus alleged that Biomet stole its trade secrets regarding a bonecement product and produced its own version of the product in 2005.3 To
prove its case, Heraeus sought electronic discovery (e-discovery) of a vast
†
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28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006).
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Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 2011).
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number of documents, dating back to 1996, relating to Biomet’s
development of its bone-cement product “from conception to finished
formula[,] and the steps used to manufacture the products,” including
communications between Biomet and third-party companies.4 The
discovery request was of typical breadth for U.S. litigation, requesting “all
documents referring or relating to” various matters “defined to the broadest
extent permitted by law.”5
Although Heraeus’s petition was not an unusual request for U.S.
courts, almost all of the documents requested were completely unobtainable
within the frame of the ongoing German litigation.6 As the Seventh Circuit
noted when the decision was appealed, “[a] party to a German lawsuit
cannot demand categories of documents from his opponent. All he can
demand are documents that he is able to identify specifically—individually,
not by category.”7 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded
the district court’s denial of the § 1782 motion. On remand, the Seventh
Circuit directed the district court to “not bother itself with section 1782 any
longer,” but instead “to consider Heraeus’s requests as it would any other
discovery request in a complex case,” under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP).8
This Issue Brief uses Heraeus as a springboard to explore 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 discovery request motions in the context of e-discovery in civil
litigation.9 It argues that the courts’ reasoning is problematic because it fails
to address comparative law. As such, this Brief proposes a more limited
view of § 1782 requests based on the idea that different legal systems have
different procedures for a reason, at least partially because one procedure
(here, the scope of discovery) is connected to countless other procedures
(e.g., factfinding, admissibility of evidence, etc.). A provision like § 1782—
that allows one party, but not both, a workaround in one area of civil
procedure—should be examined in light of its repercussions in foreign
litigation rather than treated as a normal request under the FRCP in U.S.
domestic litigation. Only by examining the matter using a comparative
4

In re Application of Heraeus Kulzer for Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1782,
No. 3:09309-CV-183RM, 2009 WL 2058718, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 9, 2009) rev'd
sub nom. Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011).
5
Id. The request further defined “the terms ‘concerning’ or ‘relating to’ [to] mean
‘in any way relevant to the subject matter of the request.’” Id.
6
Heraeus Kulzer, 633 F.3d at 596.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 599.
9
Section 1782 has also been applied to foreign criminal proceedings against U.S.
domiciliaries. E.g. In re Czech, No. 3:08-mc-001-J-33TEM, 2008 WL 179263, at
*2–3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2008).
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approach can a court truly assess the fairness of granting a discovery request
in a foreign proceeding.
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background
material. It first gives an introduction to the differences between the U.S.
legal system and the civil law system that exists in most other countries,
with special attention to evidence-gathering procedures. A discussion of the
explosive growth of electronic information and its role in the discovery
process follows. Part II summarizes the jurisprudence surrounding § 1782
requests. Part III uses comparative law techniques to highlight the equitable
shortcomings of current § 1782 jurisprudence by (i) examining potential
abuse, (ii) contrasting § 1782 jurisprudence with the reasoning courts use in
granting discovery requests against international parties in U.S. trials, and
(iii) comparing e-discovery to forum non conveniens jurispurdence. Part IV
then proposes a two-part change in § 1782 jurisprudence that would give
courts the discretion to bar discovery requests based on foreigndiscoverability rules and adopt a comparative law approach to the balancing
test in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,10 due to the changing
nature of technology and exponential growth of e-discovery.

I. BACKGROUND
Discovery, the evidence-collecting, fact-gathering middle-step of
litigation, has often posed difficulties in cross-border litigation.11 Different
countries have different legal systems, which typically have different
perceptions of privacy, different views on the amount of information
discoverable in civil proceedings, and different evidentiary standards.12
Trials that involve litigants from different countries or between litigants
from the same nation that require evidence in a second state compound
these differences.13 As we enter an age in which most evidence is in the
10

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
See, e.g., Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 522 (1987) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should still be employed by U.S. courts, even when they conflict with
rules from the Hague Convention on Evidence, to which the U.S. is a party); cf.
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932) (requiring a U.S. citizen to
return from France to the United States to present testimony as a witness in a
criminal trial in the U.S.).
12
For a more detailed description of these complex, interrelated questions, see infra
Part I.A.
13
See, e.g., Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 375–76 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
that an American court did not have to recognize a French blocking statute due to
either personal privacy or national interests); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242
F.R.D. 199, 227–28 (E.D.N.Y 2007) (granting plaintiff’s discovery request for
11
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form of electronically-stored information (ESI), the difficulties have not
become simpler. The very technology that makes it easier to transfer
evidentiary data from one country to another also makes the process more
challenging. Because modern discovery involves significantly more data
than in the past, the flood of information exacerbates concerns regarding the
cost and duration of discovery, as well as the protection of litigants’
privacy.14 This segment includes background information regarding
transnational discovery in the digital age in two parts: Section A gives a
brief comparative approach, and Section B narrows the topic to discovery
with a focus on ESI and the data revolution of the past two decades.

A. Comparative Law and its Relation to International Discovery
Quite simply, comparative law “is the comparison of the different
legal systems of the world.”15 Comparative law scholars compare and
analyze “the spirit and style of different legal systems, the methods of
thought and procedures they use” at the macrolevel,16 and the differences in
“specific legal institutions[, and] the rules used to solve actual problems or
particular conflicts of interests” at the microlevel.17 Instead of simply
describing different foreign legal systems, comparative law makes explicit
comparisons between different legal systems and focuses on the functional
significance of those differences.18 Whether or not American judges
explicitly state their reliance on comparative law techniques in transnational
litigation decisions, judges often do incorporate the comparison of different
legal systems into their opinions,19 including in e-discovery cases.20

financial records relating to terrorist financing). A French lawyer involved with the
Strauss case was convicted under French law for violating the blocking statute.
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, DANIEL J. CAPRA & THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 208, West Nutshell Series,
(2009).
14
For example, many nations have strict data-protection laws, and some European
nations have enacted blocking statutes that proscribe compliance with American
courts’ discovery orders. E.g. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] loi no. 90-538, art. 1A (Fr.);
SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB], CODE PÉNAL SUISSE [CP], CODICE
PENALE SVIZZERO [CP] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 273 (Switz.); Pres. Dec. No. 1718
(Phil.).
15
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 2
(Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998).
16
Id. at 4.
17
Id. at 5.
18
John C. Reitz, How to do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 617 (1998).
19
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (discussing a European
Court of Human Rights case that paralleled the facts of the case at issue in the
litigation); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
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Comparative law often focuses on the world’s two primary legal
traditions: common law and civil law.21 Common law, the supposed
“seamless web” of judge-made law, predominates in the former British
Empire,22 while civil law, found throughout most of Europe, much of Latin
America, and many countries around the rest of the globe, relies on detailed
legislative codes.23 Tangible differences stem from the different origins,
development, and general geist of these two systems and affect procedure
(as well as substantive rules, of course) in everyday litigation.24 Examples
include differences in personal jurisdiction25 and service of process26 in civil
and common law countries.
concurring) (“The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European
Union, for example, all provide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies,
will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations or decrees enacted
by the central ‘federal’ body.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel
Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 651–54 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing
the emergency governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom after
World War in contrast to the U.S. president’s constitutional powers); Bodum USA,
Inc. v. La Cafétière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 633–38 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (comparing provisions in the French Civil and Commercial Codes
relating to parole evidence to the U.S. common law approach to the topic).
20
See, e.g., Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir.
2011) (“Discovery in the federal court system is far broader than in most (maybe
all) foreign countries . . . .”).
21
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 1 (3d ed. 2007).
22
See generally Geoffrey Samuel, Common Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 145, 145–53 (Jan Smits ed., 2006) (introducing the common
law as a legal tradition).
23
See generally Maria Luisa Murillo, The Evolution of Codification in the Civil
Law Legal Systems: Towards Decodification and Recodification, 11 FLA. ST. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 163, 163–70, 3–10 (discussing the history of and
importance of codes in the civil law tradition).
24
See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure—
Reforms and Trends in Western and Eastern Europe, 69 MICH. L. REV. 847, 885–
86 (1971) (discussing the connection of the field of procedure with greater societal
values, customs, and trends as part of a call to broaden procedural legal studies).
For example, civil and common law countries have quite different rules relating to
personal jurisdiction in international cases.
25
See Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003,
1007–11 (2006) (discussing differences in jurisdiction that result from the “style
and flexibility” of the legal systems’ rules, divergent goals due to differences in the
regulatory nature of litigation, and different actors involved in the creation and
enforcement of the rules).
26
See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 880–81 (5th ed. 2011) (describing the differences in
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These distinct legal systems also significantly affect rules on the
gathering of evidence and discovery. To start, U.S.-style discovery is much
broader than discovery almost anywhere else in the world, based on the
“premise . . . that fair, effective dispute resolution requires giving litigants
the legal power to obtain largely unhindered access to all information that
could be relevant to the resolution of their dispute.”27 This information is
intended to “make a trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and the facts disclosed to the fullest practicable
extent.”28 In the adversarial common law system, private parties direct the
litigation; by contrast, the court and the judge have a more active role in the
inquisitorial civil law tradition.29 For example, the court—rather than the
parties—is responsible for gathering evidence in a civil law country,30 and
because many civil law countries regard the evidence-gathering process as a
sovereign act, private parties are not allowed to collect evidence on their
own.31 Similarly, in European civil law, a litigant’s privacy rights are
significantly broader terms than in American common-law courts.32
The distinct nature of the factfinder also creates dissimilarities in
the discovery process among nations. The common law jury system,
particularly in America, has shaped evidentiary rules, many of which are
devoted to ensuring that the finder of fact (the jury) properly considers what

concepts regarding service of process in U.S. courts, where it is generally a routine
undertaking by the plaintiff, and in civil law systems, where it is effected by
designated officials under the court’s supervision).
27
Id. at 965.
28
Id. at 966 (quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682–83
(1958)).
29
See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1682–
83 (2009) (“This is one of two grand axes along which comparative law scholars,
following Mirjan Damaska, tend to divide adversarial, common law process from
inquisitorial, civil law process; the other axis distinguishes the ‘hierarchical’
organization of civil law adjudication from the flatter, more ‘coordinate’
organization traditionally associated with common law courts.”).
30
Kathleen Braun Gilchrist, Note, Rethinking Jurisdictional Discovery under the
Hague Evidence Convention, 44 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 161 (2011).
31
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 26, at 969.
32
See Robert Hardaway, Dustin D. Berger & Andrea Defield, E-Discovery’s Threat
to Civil Litigation: Reevaluation Rule 26 for the Digital Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REV.
521, 524 (2011) (“Not surprisingly, the exercise of such broad and invasive
investigatory powers by private litigants in American civil courts has appalled
much of the civilized world, particularly when American courts purport to authorize
or even order an investigative process that extends, vigilante-like, into other
countries.”).
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lies before them.33 Because the judge is the finder of fact in the civil law
system, the same evidentiary protections are not required—the judge is
deemed capable of weighing the appropriate evidence and disregarding that
which is irrelevant or unreliable.34

B. The Explosion of Technology in Discovery
The recent “explosion of information” that has transformed the
discovery process has only exacerbated the existing differences between
American discovery and evidence-gathering techniques used by the rest of
the world. Discovery has evolved from boxes of hard-copy documents in a
file room into a complex labyrinth of ESI produced by internet
communications and office automation.35 Globally, the amount of data is
increasing exponentially.36 Between 2004 and 2007, the average amount of
information stored by a Fortune 1000 company quintupled,37 while the
average amount of data produced by American midsize companies
increased fifty-fold.38 Because of this, e-discovery has permeated present
day trial practice—particularly complex civil litigation—due to the vast
33

See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative
Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 288–92 (2002) (discussing the jury’s
“importance in American trials that is unparalleled elsewhere in the world”).
34
See id. (“[C]ivil juries have never been found in any of the countries that follow
Continental procedure.”); see also Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d
591, 594 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[F]oreign courts, because they almost never use juries in
civil cases, have, compared to American courts, loose, permissive—sometimes
even no—standards (other than privilege) for limiting the admissibility of
evidence.”). For a comparative approach to evidentiary rules, factfinding, and
procedure, see generally MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997).
35
SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 1. ESI comes in myriad forms: custodianbased data (created by persons while using applications on computers, cell phones,
or personal digital assistants), application data, personal digital devices, messaging
systems, enterprise-based data (data created by an enterprise-wide application and
stored on a central server, organization-specific application data, databases, generic
enterprise applications (i.e. programs generally available that generate accounting,
customer, records, etc. information), the internet and intranet. Id. at 6–14.
Additionally, this data is stored in a variety of ways—online, near-line (i.e. on CDs,
flash drives), or offline. Id. at 14–16. It also includes metadata, additional
information that is neither viewable no accessible the computer user and “reflects
data regarding the generation, handling, transfer, and storage of the document or
file within the computer system.” Id. at 156.
36
In 2003, the global data set was only five exabytes (five billion gigabytes). Id. at
3. It grew to 161 extabytes in 2006, and it was estimated at 255 in 2007. Id.
37
Stored data rose from 190 terabytes to one thousand terabytes (one petabyte) on
average. Id.
38
Stored data rose from two terabytes to one hundred terabyes on average. Id. This
data was collected from a sample of 9,000 companies. Id.
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amount of data that companies store, much of which could be relevant
during litigation,39 as the Heraeus discovery requests illustrate. Given the
immense time and expense associated with e-discovery, it can
unsurprisingly be used as a litigation tool in and of itself40 and can easily
become the subject of potential foreign relations conflicts.41
Although the process of discovery has changed drastically over the
past two decades, and despite the American FRCP’s 2006 update to address
the technological revolution in litigation, the international norms for
evidence collection have not kept pace. International e-discovery is
governed (in theory, at least) by the Hague Convention on Evidence, which
dates back to 1970.42 U.S. law on cross-border e-discovery, which
succumbed to a “trend of rejecting the mandatory use of the Hague

39

A recent law review example of a hypothetical case involving one billion e-mail
records where one-quarter have “one or more attachments of varying length (1 to
300 pages)” illustrates the practical effects of this information overload on
litigation. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal
System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 20 (2007). Id. The authors assumed that
1% of the data, or ten million emails, were deemed relevant after an initial search
and that a reviewer averaged fifty emails (including attachments) per hour. Id. They
concluded that “the case would . . . cost $20 million for a first pass review
conducted by 100 people over 28 weeks, without accounting for any additional
privilege review.” Id.
40
See, e.g., In re Seroquel Products Liability Litigation, 244 F.R.D. 650, 664–65
(M.D. Fla. 2007) (rebuking and sanctioning defendant for engaging in
“purposeful[] sluggish[ness]” sluggishness” with regard to producing ESI that
“benefitted [defendant] by limiting the time available to Plaintiffs to review
information and to follow up.”); see also INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYSTEM, Electronic Discovery: A View from the Front Lines 4 (2008),
available
at
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/
EDiscovery_View_Front_Lines2007.pdf (discussing how e-discovery burdens can
be great enough to pressure defendants to settle if the cost of producing all relevant
information would be more than simply settling the case). The U.S. government is
not immune from the burdens of producing ESI. See id. at 8 (describing two cases,
United States v. Philip Morris and a discrimination case against the Secret Service
where the government had to sift through thousands of electronic documents
produced over a number of years).
41
See Hardaway et al., supra note 32, at 590 (“Data protection and privacy laws of
foreign nations constrain the extraterritorial application of otherwise liberal
discovery practices of American courts.”).
42
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18,
1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague Convention on Evidence], available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt20en.pdf.
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Convention” in the 2000’s,43 has the same problems: many of the key
precedential decisions predate the technological boom.44

II. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 AND INTERNATIONAL DISCOVERY
Section 1782 of Title 28 of the United States Code permits U.S.
courts to compel discovery for cases in foreign or international tribunals.45
The statute provides, “The district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before
formal accusation.”46 Either the foreign or international tribunal itself or an
interested party in the litigation may make the request.47 The last part of the
code provision gives the applicable procedure under which the evidence is
to be produced, using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a default
when an alternative foreign or international procedure is not specified.48
This provision was designed to provide “equitable and efficacious”
procedures to benefit litigants abroad and to encourage foreign countries to
adopt similar, reciprocal procedures in this area.49 The Second Circuit
43

Kristen A. Knapp, Enforcement of U.S. Electronic Discovery Law Against
Foreign Companies: Should U.S. Courts Give Effect to the EU Data Protection
Directive?, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 111, 121 (2010).
44
E.g., Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
45
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. (“By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has power to administer
any necessary oath and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe
the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and
procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the
testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent that
the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken,
and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement
or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable
privilege.”).
49
See S.Rep. No. 88-1580, at 1(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3783
(“Enactment of the bill into law will constitute a major step in bringing the United
States to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations
and thereby providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of
tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international aspects. It is hoped
that the initiative taken by the United States in improving its procedures will invite
foreign countries similarly to adjust their procedures.”). Furthermore, having other
countries adopt more liberal discovery procedures “might benefit U.S. litigants in
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noted, “In pursuit of these twin goals, the statute has, over the years, been
given increasingly broad applicability.”50
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., the leading Supreme
Court case interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1782, involved an antitrust claim filed
against Intel Corp. (Intel) in the European Communities.51 Advanced Micro
Devices (AMD) sought documents Intel had produced in a prior case in
U.S. District Court in Alabama.52 The Supreme Court used this dispute as a
vehicle through which it could clarify the law—about which lower courts
were divided—surrounding this provision. The Court held that § 1782
authorized the district court to assist with discovery in the foreign
proceeding and remanded the case for a decision based on the district
court’s discretion.53
The Court’s specific holding rests in two parts: (1) deciding that
documents requested pursuant to § 1782 need not be discoverable under the
laws of the foreign jurisdiction in which the case is being litigated; and (2)
establishing a four-factor test to determine the appropriateness of granting
the discovery motion. First, § 1782 imposes no foreign-discoverability
requirement.54 That is, the provision does not “categorically bar a district
court from ordering production of documents when the foreign tribunal or
the ‘interested person’ would not be able to obtain the documents if they
were located in the foreign jurisdiction[].”55 The Court also determined that
discovery is available through § 1782 to complainants who are not actual
litigants in the case and are not sovereign agents.56 The proceeding before
the foreign tribunal need not be “pending or at least imminent for an
applicant to invoke § 1782(a).”57 These holdings significantly expanded
prior lower court interpretations of the scope of § 1782.
Intel also created a four-factor test for lower courts to utilize when
considering § 1782 motions: “(1) whether the person from whom discovery
is sought is a participant in the foreign case; (2) the nature and character of
those countries. And since the foreign court could always exclude the fruits of U.S.
discovery, it seemed that allowing such discovery could only help, and not hurt, the
foreign tribunal.” Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 594 (7th
Cir. 2011).
50
Brandi-Dohrn v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 673 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004).
52
Id. at 250–51
53
Id. at 266.
54
Id. at 253.
55
Id. at 259–60.
56
Id. at 253–54.
57
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the foreign proceeding, and whether the foreign court is receptive to judicial
assistance from the United States; (3) whether the discovery request is an
attempt to avoid foreign evidence-gathering restrictions; and (4) whether the
discovery request is unduly intrusive or burdensome.”58 This mode of
analysis leaves district courts with a significant degree of discretion.59

III. THE NEED FOR A CHANGE
This three-part section seeks to establish that current 28 U.S.C. §
1782 jurisprudence does not comport with comparative law norms, and
therefore may lead to both abuse by parties and conflict with reasoning that
is characteristic of other aspects of international-litigation procedure.

A. Potential for Abuse
The recent Seventh Circuit case Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet,
Inc.60 follows the trend toward broad § 1782 discoverability in e-discovery
cases. As discussed in the Introduction, the Court of Appeals in Heraeus
granted the foreign party’s e-discovery request, reversing the district court’s
refusal to do so and directing the district court “to consider Heraeus's
requests as it would any other discovery request in a complex case.”61
Although Judge Posner’s opinion found no reason not to grant the § 1782
petition, it pointed to several flaws and potential ways that the current
system could be abused,62 including harassing opponents or burdening the
foreign court.63 Both of the abuses identified by Judge Posner are much

58

London v. Does 1-4, 279 F. App'x 513, 515 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Intel, 542
U.S. 264–66) (internal quotations omitted).
59
See, e.g. In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 162–64 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying
Intel’s four-factor test to the present case in finding that discovery was appropriate);
Marubeni Am. Corp. v. LBA Y.K., 335 F. App'x 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming
district court’s analysis of the Intel factors in its decision to grant a § 1782
discovery motion); In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Intel,
542 U.S. at 259) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized the ‘broad range of
discovery’ authorized under § 1782 and has held that § 1782 is not limited to
proceedings that are pending or imminent.”).
60
Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011).
61
Id. at 599.
62
See id. at 593–95 (“Discovery in the federal court system is far broader than in
most (maybe all) foreign countries. . . . [D]istrict courts must be alert for potential
abuses that would warrant a denial of an application to be allowed to take such
discovery.”).
63
Id. at 594.
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more significant today than in years past due to the sheer amount of
information in the digital age.64
The decision discusses several ways that a § 1782 motion could be
used to harass one’s opponent. First, a litigant who in a U.S. court seeks
discovery “that it could obtain in the foreign jurisdiction, [would]
gratuitously forc[e] his opponent to proceed in two separate court
systems.”65 A similar inference follows from a situation in which a party
seeks U.S.-compelled discovery of documents that were inadmissible as
evidence in the foreign court, because the discovery request would not
actually help the party at trial in the foreign tribunal.66 Similarly, one party
might impose massive (and unexpected) costs upon the other litigant
through numerous U.S. discovery requests, spurred by the proliferation of
documents, and the expense of obtaining them, in the e-discovery era.67
Judge Posner takes a comparative law approach in recognizing the
possibility that § 1782 requests can result in a mismatch between the
amount of discovery and the foreign court’s approach to evidence. He
acknowledges that there is certainly the “danger of swamping a foreign
court with fruits of American discovery that would be inadmissible in an
American court because admissibility is not a criterion of discoverability in
our system.”68 The opinion acknowledges that the potential mismatch stems
from the fact that civil law systems, because they lack juries, have “loose,
permissive—sometimes even no—standards (other than privilege) for
limiting the admissibility of evidence.”69 Furthermore, the mismatch might
burden not only the court but also the U.S. litigant because the other party
may be able to use broad discovery procedures to obtain much more
information about the U.S. party than the U.S. party could obtain regarding
the foreign party in the foreign judicial system.70 The Heraeus decision
finally cautions district courts to “watch out for” one “party’s effort to

64

See, e.g., id. at 594–95. (“A discovery demand in our courts might yield a haul of
30 million emails, few of which would be admissible in evidence. A litigant in a
foreign court who had obtained such a haul would be unlikely to dump the whole
mass of emails on that court, but if he did try to overwhelm the court with
documentation the court might not be well equipped by its procedures to stem the
flow.”).
65
Id. at 594.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 595; see also Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 649 (10th Cir.
2008) (acknowledging the potential costs of § 1782 discovery claims).
68
Heraeus Kulzer, 633 F.3d at 594.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 595.
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combine the substantive law of a foreign country with the expansive
discovery opportunities available in the United States.”71
Although Heraeus’s actual holding reversed the district court’s
refusal to grant discovery and encouraged the lower court to treat § 1782
motions like simple domestic discovery requests, the dicta of the opinion
encouraged a probing approach that recognizes potential abuses stemming
from differences in the forum court’s legal system and that of the U.S.
court. Part IV, infra, advocates the same reasoning in similar contexts:
adding to the Intel test a close examination of the potential abuses of § 1782
claims that could stem from a disjunction in procedure between the two
legal systems.

B. Analogous Procedural Norms
This section briefly examines the reasoning U.S. courts use to
compel discovery against a foreign party in cases in which that party is
embroiled in litigation in a U.S. court (§ 1782 deals with the opposite
phenomenon—a U.S. party engaged in litigation overseas) and to assess
motions to dismiss proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
The first question courts have attempted to resolve is the extent to
which U.S. courts may unilaterally compel discovery against a foreign
litigant. The seminal case in this area, Société Nationale Industrielle
Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the S. District of Iowa,72 in 1987,
made legal and permanent the reluctance of American courts to defer to the
Hague Convention on Evidence for discovery.73 The Court held that the
Convention does not preempt the FRCP.74 The Court found that the plain
language of the Hague Convention foreclosed use of its procedures as
“exclusive” or “mandatory” for conducting discovery in a foreign country.75
It instead concluded that the Convention’s text and legislative history
“unambiguously support[ed] the conclusion that it was intended to establish
optional procedures.”76
Therefore, in the Court’s judgment, the district court could compel
the foreign party to produce documents, because “the Hague Convention
did not deprive the District Court of the jurisdiction it otherwise possessed
71

Id. Forum-selection clauses in contracts with a preference for non-discoveryladen systems or a plaintiff bringing suit in an inconvenient forum may evince this
phenomenon.
72
482 U.S. 522 (1987).
73
Id. at 534.
74
Id. at 539–40.
75
Id. at 529.
76
Id. at 538.
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to order a foreign national party before it to produce evidence physically
located within a signatory nation.”77 A converse holding “would effectively
subject every American court hearing a case involving a national of a
contracting state to the internal laws of that state.”78 Although the Court did
not accept the Convention rules as binding as a matter of law, it also refused
to make a common law, prudential rule of its own to require following
Convention procedures.79 Thus, after Société Nationale, district courts
retained their power to order non-U.S. parties to produce evidence
physically or digitally located within a signatory nation.80 The Société
Nationale decision is now firmly entrenched in U.S. law. It has been
“codified” in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law81 and has
shaped the lower courts’ discovery practices.82
The Court in Société Nationale gave three practical reasons for its
decision, all relating to “fairness.” The opinion focused on the fact that
mandatory use of the Hague Convention would produce inequalities among
parties to the same litigation in three ways. First, a domestic party would
have to go through the Convention to obtain evidence, while the foreign
party could simply use the FRCP.83 Second, and as a consequence of the
first result, the different procedures in the Hague Convention and the more
lenient and expansive FRCP would produce inequalities, because the
foreign party would be able to obtain more information regarding the U.S.
party through the FRCP than the U.S. party would be able to obtain
regarding the foreign party through the Hague Convention.84 Thus, in a
77

Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 539.
79
Id. at 542.
80
Id. at 539.
81
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442 (1987)
(discussing the factors that courts must balance in deciding whether to grant a
discovery request for information located abroad).
82
See, e.g., Lechoslaw v. Bank of Am., N.A., 618 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 2010)
(affirming district court’s refusal to grant discovery under the Hague Convention);
In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 306 (3d Cir. 2004)
(Roth, J., concurring) (“I write separately to express my concern that the Hague
Convention has been given short shrift since the Supreme Court's decision in
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale.”); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling
Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing Société Nationale and
its progeny when evaluating the claim that Chinese state secrecy laws prohibited a
foreign litigant from producing information in discovery).
83
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 565–66 (Blackmun J.,
dissenting).
84
See id. at 565. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The second major United States
interest is in fair and equal treatment of litigants.”).
78
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single trial in a U.S. court, the different parties would have access to vastly
different stores of information. This reason, vocalized in 1987, only rings
truer today due to the greater amount of ESI and costs of retrieving it.85
Finally, the Court added that using the Hague Convention could create
unfairness between litigants from the foreign countries who were not
convention signatories and those litigants from countries that signed the
treaty.86
This focus on fairness, or equal treatment of the two litigants within
a single trial, is very different from what occurs when courts grant § 1782
requests. Most often, granting a § 1782 request creates informational
asymmetries between the party obtaining otherwise undiscoverable
information and the party giving up such information only to be unable to
reciprocate with a similar discovery request. Thus, although both Intel and
Société Nationale do grant discovery requests in international cases, they
are largely incongruent. While under Société Nationale, both parties are
allowed equal discovery under the same standards (those of the forum
state), under Intel, U.S. courts affirmatively grant discovery, which will
most often create an unequal playing field within the foreign litigation. This
is because the information requested is typically unobtainable under the
forum’s procedural rules. Thus, allowing discovery in each scenario has
very different effects upon the ongoing litigation.
Second, forum non conveniens analysis often involves comparatively
weighing procedures in the foreign court system against the procedures of
the U.S. forum. This indicates that courts do have experience balancing U.S.
interests against foreign-court procedures on a frequent basis. In forum non
conveniens cases, the defendant files a motion to dismiss the action in the
U.S. court in favor of an alterative forum. Assuming an alternative forum is
available, the district court has significant discretion in assessing the
adequacy of that forum by balancing public interest, private interests, and
justice.87
The forum non conveniens comparison also shows that U.S. courts
do not consider the type of broad discovery available in § 1782 requests to
be necessary for a foreign country to be fit as an alternative forum. The
simple fact that a foreign forum does not have U.S.-style discovery does not
make the foreign forum inadequate or inappropriate; 88 it is but one factor to
85

See supra note 36.
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 539.
87
John Fellas, Strategy in International Litigation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
317, 326 (2008).
88
E.g., Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F. Supp. 1117, 1123-24 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
86
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be considered when balancing the adequacy of the alternative forum.89 A
U.S. court may still dismiss a case in favor of a civil law jurisdiction
without even considering the type of discovery available in the foreign
proceeding in the balance of private interests.90 Therefore, U.S. courts in
another context have determined that sweeping discovery is not necessary to
make a foreign proceeding adequate, thus recognizing the differences in the
nature of discovery in common law and civil law systems.

IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
Due to the potential for abuse, this Issue Brief advocates a more
cautious approach to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 than is found in the current
jurisprudence. First, courts should carefully differentiate between § 1782
discovery requests that originate from the foreign court and those that arise
from other sources, including the adverse party, when litigation occurs in a
foreign law forum. If the foreign tribunal requests the information, there is a
presumption that the information is consistent with the plan and direction of
the trial and that the foreign court deems the information to fit into the
proceeding.91 Although Intel imposed no foreign-discoverability
requirement on requests by foreign parties, the decision recognized that the
identity of the requesting party may be significant.
Second, the other three factors of the balancing test can be viewed
through a comparative law lens, by looking specifically at how the
information obtained through the § 1782 procedure would be used in the
context of the foreign-forum trial. The Seventh Circuit used a similar
approach in Heraeus.92 These other factors include elements that are
amenable to a comparative law analysis, as described in Part I.A, such as
89

See, e.g., Windt v. Qwest Communications Intern., Inc., 544 F.Supp.2d 409, 426
(D.N.J. 2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (first alteration in original)
(“Differences in civil procedure of the competing forums are viewed through the
prism of whether there is a danger that [as a result of the alternative proceedings,
Plaintiffs would] be deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly. Concluding
otherwise would effectively preclude all forum non conveniens dismissals in favor
of any Roman-law-based civil jurisdiction, since all continental European
jurisdictions provide for less discovery than that available in common law legal
systems. As long as the [other] legal system provides procedure ample to render a
fair decision under the . . . law, the distinction in the scope of discovery cannot
serve as a basis for denial of forum non conveniens dismissal.”); cf. In re Union
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
90
See id.
91
Note that a foreign judgment against a U.S. defendant cannot be enforced unless
a U.S. court determines that the foreign proceeding was fair. BORN & RUTLEDGE,
supra note 26, at 1081–83.
92
See supra notes 68–71.
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the nature and the character of the foreign proceeding, whether the
discovery request is simply functioning as a work-around of the foreign
evidence-gathering rules, and whether the request would be overly intrusive
or burdensome.93 For example, a court should first examine how well the
foreign court is equipped to deal with the amount of information that would
be collected if the request were granted, and then it should look for possible
asymmetries of information that could result.
The Supreme Court in Intel wrote, “Section 1782 is a provision for
assistance to tribunals abroad. It does not direct United States courts to
engage in comparative analysis to determine whether analogous
proceedings exist here. Comparisons of that order can be fraught with
danger.”94 This statement, however, conflicts with a careful application of
the balancing factors set forth in Part IV. Courts should instead be urged to
employ comparative techniques when they employ the four-factor analysis.
This approach has several benefits. First, it aligns with the idea
from Société Nationale that U.S. courts have a duty to “exercise special
vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or
unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvantageous
position” and need to supervise discovery “to minimize its costs and
inconvenience and to prevent improper uses of discovery requests.”95 If
such an obligation attaches to U.S. courts’ discretionary treatment of
foreign litigants in U.S. courts, why should the same not attach to the
protection of the U.S. party abroad in the examination of another
discretionary matter in transnational civil litigation?
Second, by considering § 1782 discovery requests merely in the
context of the foreign trial itself, as was done in Heraeus, U.S. courts can
decrease the potential for abusive discovery, which has only increased since
the 2004 Intel decision because companies store much more discoverable
ESI.96 Discovery in the electronic age has transformed into a tool of
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See supra note 58.
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 263 (2004).
95
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
96
See supra notes 36–38.
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potential abuse,97 and therefore warrants closer scrutiny than Congress
originally anticipated.98
Third, this analysis prevents the mismatch of very broad discovery
with a foreign court ill-equipped to handle that amount of information. The
idea that the litigant must take the procedures of the forum as he finds it is
well-entrenched in complex, international civil litigation.99 That is, a litigant
cannot have his cake by choosing to litigate in one forum, and eat it too by
benefitting from the procedural rules of another.100 This is a basic tenant of
the comparative law approach; because of the interconnectedness of
procedural rules and the nature of the legal system, outcomes may become
skewed by any mismatch created by conducting an isolated legal transplant
of one rule into another system.101 Therefore, even if a mechanism exists for
a party to obtain U.S.-style discovery in a foreign proceeding, such
discovery cannot simply be transplanted into a trial in another legal system
with completely different procedural norms. This is particularly so when
those normative differences are foundational, and stem from the
inquisitorial (rather than adversarial) nature of the system, the role of the
97

See, e.g., Patton Boggs, LLP v. Chevron Corp., 791 F.Supp.2d 13, 20 (D.D.C.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing Chevron’s litigation tactics in
a lawsuit against Ecuadorian plaintiffs in which Chevron initiated multiple § 1782
discovery motions with the goal of “burying the Lago Agrio plaintiffs' counsel
beneath a mountain of discovery requests”).
98
For an idea of how far ESI was from Congress’s mind at this time, see S.Rep.
No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782.
99
See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafétière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Having chosen to litigate in Chicago rather than arbitrate in Paris, however,
Bodum must abide by the forum’s procedural doctrines, such as the allocation of
tasks between judge and jury.”); Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum Non
Conveniens and the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, 37 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 467, 474 (2002) (citing Lubbe v. Cape PLC, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1545 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.)) (“[G]enerally speaking, the plaintiff must take a foreign
forum as he finds it, even if it is in some respects less advantageous to him than the
English forum.”).
100
Cf. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
The Second Circuit did impose some conditions on the trial in India; however, this
is somewhat of a unique circumstance because there were over 200,000 injuries and
all of the evidence in India, but one of the offending companies was a U.S.
corporation. Id. The U.S. court fully relinquished any jurisdiction or control over
the matter and refused to monitor the Indian trial. Id. at 204–05.
101
Compare William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal
Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489 (1995) (discussing Watson’s theory of legal
transplants); with Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 114 (1997) (“[L]egal transplants are
impossible.”).
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judge as factfinder, and the view of evidence-gathering as a sovereign
function.102

CONCLUSION
This Issue Brief has attempted to fill a gap in the legal scholarship
by examining the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in light of comparative law
principles, other discovery practices in which U.S. courts engage, and forum
non conveniens jurisprudence. It argues that current § 1782 jurisprudence
may overlook potential equity problems in a foreign case because of a
disjunction between American discovery notions and procedure and the
legal system in which the case is actually being tried. This situation might
harm the U.S. party participating in the foreign proceeding, for they might
be subjected to significantly greater expense and be unable to obtain similar
information regarding the foreign party if the information sought is
undiscoverable in the foreign legal system. Therefore, this Brief advocates a
comparative approach to § 1782 motions, recognizing the potential
mismatch in legal systems as in the Heraeus opinion and coloring Intel’s
balancing test through an examination of how granting discovery against the
U.S. party will affect the overall balance of the foreign trial.
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See supra notes 28–34.

